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Articles
California Constitutional Law:
The Right to an Adequate Education
Anne D. Gordon*
Plaintiffs’ victory in Vergara v. State, a case about teacher evaluation and employment
regulations, has thrust the issue of educational adequacy into the spotlight in California.
Campaign for Quality Education v. State, a case based on the California Constitution’s
education clause, has been fully briefed before the California Supreme Court and is
waiting to be set for argument. These cases require California courts to again look to the
constitution to determine what the right to education means. Although the California
Supreme Court found this right fundamental over forty years ago, no supreme court
decision has yet articulated whether this right encompasses the right to an adequate
education. There is no dearth of scholarship about adequacy on the national level, but no
scholarship has yet synthesized constitutional history and case law in California to test
how the court should decide the case. Examining these factors, as well as the failure of the
dominant doctrineequal protectionto define and ensure the right, this Article
proposes an adequacy jurisprudence that comports with California’s unique
circumstances, its history and precedent, and the purposes of education in this state. The
need for such an approach has never been greater.

* Anne Gordon is a Visiting Professor at Instituto Tecnologico de Monterrey in Puebla,
Mexico. She was formerly a Lecturer and Advocacy Fellow for the Appellate Program and Senior
Research Fellow with the California Constitution Center at the University of California Berkeley School
of Law. She received a B.A. in 2001 from Princeton University and a J.D. in 2006 from the University of
Michigan Law School. Thank you to Dr. David Carrillo for his help and advice throughout the formative
stages of this Article, and to his California Constitution Center for providing a home for California
constitutional scholarship. Thank you also to Andrew Garland, John Gordon, Steve Sugarman, John
Affeldt, Mark Yudof, Rachel Moran, and Chris Hoofnagle for providing thoughtful comments and
suggestions, and to Bill Fernholz and Barbara Karvelot for being on my team.
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Introduction
California’s free schools guarantee in article IX of the state
constitution contains both a purpose (to further intellectual, scientific,
moral, and agricultural improvement) and a command (the legislature
1
“shall provide” for a system of common schools). The California Supreme
2
Court has declared education a fundamental right. But the contours of
this right remain unclear. Through decades of litigation concerning
3
4
5
school finance, charter schools, and everything from busing schemes to
6
school fees, litigants have tested the substance of article IX again and
again, with no clear guidance from the supreme court. It is still unclear
whether there is a qualitative component to the right to an education in
article IX, and if so, what that qualitative measure requires.
This lack of clarity has two causes: first, the failure of the California
Supreme Court to directly address adequacy issues, and second, the inability
of the dominant litigation doctrine, equal protection, to answer the
fundamental question about the scope of article IX.
First, there is little scholarship, and even less law, on how California
would decide an adequacy question under its constitution. In Serrano v.
Priest, the California Supreme Court emphasized that the state constitution
guarantees the right to an education that encompasses “more than access
7
to a classroom.” Despite this, some have argued that the education
clauses confer no rights beyond maintaining basic uniformity and
progression of grades, describing “the demise of the common schools
8
clause as a means to pursue students’ basic right to education in California.”
Indeed, two lower courts have found that article IX confers no substantive
9
right to adequacy.
An analysis of the history of education litigation in California, however,
reveals that the adequacy issue has appeared time and again in the court’s
history and cases, with the court receptive not only to hearing cases based
on adequacy, but also deciding cases at least in part on that ground as well.
This has strong historical underpinnings; from the text of the constitution,
to the framers’ constitutional debates, to the cases before the supreme

1. See Cal. Const. art. IX, § 1.
2. See infra Part I.C.
3. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Cal. 1971).
4. Wilson v. State Bd. of Educ., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 745, 753–54 (1999).
5. Manjares v. Newton, 411 P.2d 901, 902–03 (Cal. 1966).
6. Complaint at 1, Doe v. California, No. BC445151 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2010).
7. Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1257.
8. See Rebecca M. Abel, The Judicial Give and Take: The Right to Equal Educational
Opportunity in California, 9 Cal. Legal Hist. 203, 215 (2014).
9. See Order Granting Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Second Cause of Action at
3–4, Williams v. California, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2003); Order Sustaining Demurrers to
Complaint and Complaint in Intervention, in Part Without Leave to Amend and in Part With Leave to
Amend at 8, Robles-Wong v. California, No. RG10-515768 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 14, 2011).
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court (in both dicta and the holdings), one can see article IX rights taking
shape as a right to an adequate education.
The primary goal of this Article is to highlight these developments
throughout California’s history and jurisprudence. It seeks to prove that
the constitutional guarantee is enforceable as a right to an adequate
education, independent from the constitutional guarantee of equality.
Second, this Article will address the inability of equal protection to
define and safeguard the right to education in California. Equal protection
challenges simply compare two things, seeking to resolve whether they are
sufficiently equivalent to pass constitutional muster. Here, that means
determining whether two educational programs are comparable. But that
analysis, while well-suited to resolving disparate treatment claims, does not
concern itself with whether the quality or content of an educational
program is constitutionally adequate under article IX.
The limitations of an equal protection approach, for instance,
ensuring that children are treated equally in areas such as funding or
educational programming, have led to a shift in the litigation landscape. In
recent years, litigants in many states have changed their approach to one
promoting adequacy, ensuring that all schools meet a baseline of quality.
Under this approach, the relevant analysis does not simply compare schools
or programs. Instead, it focuses on ensuring that the education provided to
every student meets a minimum bar of quality.
Equal protection litigation is still a critical tool for education reform in
California, and has led to many of the landmark decisions highlighted in
this Article. But relying solely on equal protection is insufficient to define
the right, and might deny a fundamental right to many students who might
have an “equal,” but ineffective, education.
Part I of this Article reviews the text and legislative history surrounding
the passage of article IX to show an enforceable, qualitative right to
education. These historical sources give a great deal of guidance into
what the framers thought about the right to education in California, and
its importance to the political, economic, and moral future of the state.
This Part also reviews the seminal cases in California education, arguing
that although many are phrased in the language of equal protection or
the free schools guarantee, they each have adequacy as a logical and
ethical underpinning. These cases also show that although the constitution
explicitly assigns to the legislature the job of ensuring a public school
system, the court will step in where it appears that students are denied the
critical components of a decent education.
Part II details why equal-protection-focused education litigation is
limited in its ability to guarantee the right to education. First, viewing the
right to education solely as an equal protection problem ignores the text
and history of the constitutional provision, subsuming it in a discussion of
equality when in fact it deserves recognition as a stand-alone right.
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Second, equal protection, standing alone, does little to solve the
underlying question of what the right entails. This Article rejects the
possibility that, as the Kentucky Supreme Court has said, an educational
program achieves equality by ensuring “uniformly deplorable conditions”
10
throughout the state. The California Supreme Court has avoided the
question by using the phrase “basic educational equality,” implying a
11
baseline, but never defining it. Without a definition, the court is left with
the “guess-and-check,” case-by-case approach we see today (finding, for
12
example, free extracurriculars, but not busing, to be part of the right).
Finally, this Article argues that equal protection is a misnomer; in
addition to being an unattainable goal, true educational equality—that is,
making all schools equal—has never been the goal of education
litigation. Nor does it alleviate the possibility of “basically equal” but
grossly inadequate schools, something that the court (and the framers)
would likely find problematic.
Just as with the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the U.S.
Constitution, the right to education in California without a guarantee of
quality would render the right hollow. Just as the right to counsel under
the U.S. Constitution requires that such counsel be effective, so too does
the fundamental right to an education require that an education conform
to a minimum guarantee of effectiveness—that is, to a minimum
guarantee of quality.
Part III turns to other states whose high courts have wrestled with
these same questions. A review of these cases shows that no state
supreme court has found a fundamental right to education without a
minimum guarantee of quality; where there is a right, there is a
minimum. If California continues to affirm the right by upholding
Serrano but finds no corresponding qualitative mandate, it would stand
alone.
Part IV outlines different approaches that the court can take when
defining an adequate education. This Article argues that none of the
prevailing methods is sufficient to fulfill the California Constitution’s
mandate within the context of its history and text. Instead, it proposes a
citizenship approach to defining adequacy, based on Justice Goodwin
13
Liu’s influential article, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship.
This method requires sufficient education to enable citizens to develop a
stable economy, become upwardly mobile, and engage in selfgovernment, such that they are able to participate in the political life of
the state. This method accords historically with the framers’ intent in
10. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989).
11. See, e.g., Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1247 (Cal. 1992).
12. Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 47 (Cal. 1984) (extracurriculars); Manjares v. Newton,
411 P.2d 901, 908 (Cal. 1966) (busing).
13. Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 Yale L.J. 330 (2006).
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passing the education clauses in the California Constitution, underlies
many of the education cases throughout the California Supreme Court’s
history, and, in the words of the California Supreme Court, is “directly
linked to the constitutional role of education in preserving democracy, as
14
set forth in article IX, section 1 . . . .”
This Article does not aim to curb the policy debate on what
constitutes a quality education in California, or how to reduce or eliminate
disparities within the school system and beyond. Nor does it seek to
foreclose efforts to ensure equal access to education using equal
protection litigation; where inequality exists that runs afoul of the equal
protection clause, a constitutional claim will (and should) succeed. This
Article has only the modest goal of assisting the state judiciary in crafting
an analysis for the qualitative issues presented by article IX that it will
inevitably face in the coming years.
I. Implicit Adequacy in the Text and History of the Constitution
A. The Text of the California Education Clause
The California Constitution guarantees a system of free schools for the
15
children of the state. The text itself is robust, including both a statement of
purpose and a functional element. The preamble, codified in article IX,
section 1, entitled “Encouragement of education,” states that a “ general
diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation
of the rights and liberties of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by
all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and
16
agricultural improvement.” Article IX, sections 2 through 4 then establish
17
a Superintendent of Public Instruction and county education boards.
Finally, section 5 on the “Common school system” establishes California’s
school system: “The Legislature shall provide for a system of common
schools by which a free school shall be kept up and supported in each
district at least six months in every year, after the first year in which a
18
school has been established.”
B. The History
The constitutional text is unambiguous in its directive to establish state
public schools. But it is ambiguous—indeed silent—on the question of what
would run afoul of that directive (aside from violating the requirement of
a free school in each district, open for six months every year).

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Hartzell, 679 P.2d at 43.
Cal. Const. art. IX, § 5.
Id. art. IX, § 1.
See id. art IV, §§ 2–4.
Id. art. IX, § 5.
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When texts are ambiguous, we look to history for guidance. The
goal here is always “to discern the true intent of their authors, and when
20
that intent has been ascertained,” to construe them as to give it effect.
As the California Supreme Court has said, although the constitution is
“necessarily couched in general terms or language, it is not to be
interpreted according to narrow or supertechnical principles, but liberally
and on broad general lines, so that it may accomplish in full measure the
objects of its establishment and so carry out the great principles of
21
government.” For these reasons, examining the framers’ perspectives by
looking briefly at California’s educational history, the framers’ experiences
in other states’ conventions, and the constitutional convention debates is
instructive in deciphering the meaning and intended force of article IX.
1.

The Framers’ Understanding of the Education Clauses

Understanding the education clauses requires an understanding of
the education climate in the late 1870s, including the political climate
surrounding school legislation in California before the 1879 constitution
and other states’ clauses from that time.
Any review of the history of California schools would be incomplete
without reference to John Swett. Swett was born in New Hampshire,
22
moved to California, and became a principal at a school in San Francisco.
In 1862, he was elected State Superintendent of Public Schools and
23
became a fierce lobbyist for free schools. He believed strongly in two
principles that animated his work: “[f]irst, that it is the duty of a . . .
[g]overnment . . . to provide for the education of every child,” and
24
second, that the schools should be provided to students for free. In
1865, he launched a major statewide public relations campaign to lobby
for his vision of public schools, including a massive petition campaign
25
targeted at legislators on the value of education, which was described as
“an act of self-preservation in a democracy,” and vital to the welfare of
26
the state. He toured the state to evaluate various schools’ conditions,
lamenting the physical facilities, desks, and textbooks as well as poor
27
teacher qualifications and pedagogical methods. His lobbying included
a massive petition campaign targeted at legislatures, to persuade them

19. Mejia v. Reed, 74 P.3d 166, 170 (Cal. 2003).
20. Bourland v. Hildreth, 26 Cal. 161, 180 (1864).
21. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1299
(Cal. 1978).
22. William G. Carr, John Swett: The Biography of an Educational Pioneer 4 (1933).
23. Irving G. Hendrick, California Education: A Brief History 11 (Norris Hundley, Jr. &
John A. Schutz eds., 1980).
24. Carr, supra note 22, at 102.
25. Hendrick, supra note 23, at 13–15.
26. Carr, supra note 22, at 102.
27. Hendrick, supra note 23, at 15.
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that a good education meant instruction in reading, writing, and “all
28
manner of practical studies.” He also frequently referred to the “necessity
for suitable buildings, capable teachers, adequate equipment, and state
29
inspection and supervision.” He felt that the teacher was “the most
30
potent single factor in determining the efficiency of the school.” Swett
mounted such an effective campaign that most legislators quickly joined
31
his cause. His influence remained even after his tenure as Superintendent
ended; in 1874, the legislature approved “An Act to Enforce the
32
Education Right of Children,” the state’s compulsory attendance law, and
in 1879, the education committee for the constitutional convention
33
“generally agreed on all the major educational issues.”
Looking to extraterritorial influences on the California Constitution,
California’s article IX was explicitly based on at least two other states’
34
constitutions. Joseph W. Winans, chairperson for the convention’s
Committee on Education, reported that section 1 was “taken from the
Constitutions of Arkansas and Missouri, in part, and from the
35
Constitution of this State.” He emphasized that the “same words” are
36
contained in the Missouri and Arkansas constitutions. Dr. Lucius
Morse, who was in Missouri in 1865 during that state’s constitutional
convention, recounted that, “We started out in Missouri with the idea of
free education, and the idea has been copied throughout the Southern
States. Section one of the article on education is in other Constitutions
37
almost in the same language that is embodied in this.”
Missouri’s role in providing its citizens a public education was
outlined in its territorial charter in 1812, which stated: “[K]nowledge,
being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind,
schools and the means of public education shall be encouraged and
38
provided for . . . .” In 1891, the Missouri Supreme Court called

28. Id. at 18. This campaign resulted in dozens of letters daily appearing on the desks of
legislatures during the 1866 legislative session. Id. at 1314.
29. Carr, supra note 22, at 102. He also believed that the state should enforce minimum
standards of safety and sanitation.
30. Id. at 104.
31. Hendrick, supra note 23, at 14.
32. Id. at 17.
33. Id. at 19.
34. Winans was a lawyer and representative from the First Congressional District. Roy W.
Cloud, Education in California: Leaders, Organizations, and Accomplishments of the First
Hundred Years 67 (1952).
35. 2 Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of the State of California
1087 (1881) [hereinafter 1879 Debates].
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1089.
38. Territorial Laws of Missouri, vol. I, ch. IV, § 14 at 13 (approved June 4, 1812) (cited in Comm.
for Educ. Equality v. Missouri, 294 S.W.3d 477, 482 n.5 (Mo. 2009)).

F - Gordon_18 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

February 2016]

2/9/2016 1:36 PM

THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION

331

education “a right created by the state, and a right belonging to citizens
39
of this state as such.”
The 1865 Missouri Constitution provides that, “the General
Assembly shall establish and maintain free schools, for the gratuitous
instruction of all persons in this State, between the ages of five and
40
twenty-one years.” Further, “[o]nly the constitutions of New Jersey in
1844 and Wisconsin in 1848, twenty years earlier, had similarly spoken in
terms of ‘all’ children rather than in terms of a ‘system’ of schools, but
beginning with the Missouri Constitution of 1865 such language became
41
more common.”
Looking to the history of the Arkansas Constitution, the framers of
the first Arkansas Constitution adopted the following Education Clause
in 1836:
Knowledge and learning generally diffused through a community being
essential to the preservation of a free government; and diffusing the
opportunities and advantages of education through the various parts of the
State being highly conducive to this end . . . . The General Assembly
shall, from time to time, pass such laws as shall be calculated to
encourage intellectual, scientific and agricultural improvement by
allowing rewards and immunities for the promotion and improvement of
Arts, Science, Commerce, Manufactures and Natural History. And
countenance and encourage the principels [sic] of humanity, industry and
42
morality.

This provision embodied two fundamental ideas: “the inherent value of
education in creating a virtuous citizen and the crucial role of an educated
43
citizenry in a functioning democracy.” In a later Arkansas Supreme
Court decision, the court concluded that given this history, “[t]here is no
question in this court’s mind that the requirement of a general, suitable,
and efficient system of free public schools places on the State an absolute
duty to provide the school children of Arkansas with an adequate
44
education.”
The framers of the California Constitution, by explicitly borrowing
from the robust provisions in the Arkansas Constitution and the Missouri
Constitution, must have intended to give California’s education clause
similar force. Swett’s legacy, as well, focused not just on providing
education, but also on ensuring that the children of California had
enough education to ensure the perpetuation of democracy. The history,
as communicated through the language of article IX, is clear: the framers

39. Lehew v. Brummell, 15 S.W. 765, 766 (Mo. 1891).
40. Mo. Const. of 1865, art. IX, § 1.
41. John C. Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State
Constitutional Provisions for Education 1776–1900, 42 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1, 23 (1998).
42. Ark. Const. of 1836, art. VII, § 1 (1987).
43. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cty. v. Huckabee, 91 S.W.3d 472, 491 (Ark. 2002).
44. Id. at 492.
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felt the necessity of an educated populace in furthering the causes of selfgovernment and general well-being. To this end, an adequate education,
not simply any education, was the intent of the provision.
2. The 1849 and 1879 Constitutional Conventions
During the state’s first constitutional convention in preparation for
the 1849 constitution, the framers had a robust debate concerning the
education provision. There, delegate Morton McCarver, using the
example of other states, admonished the rest of the convention that there
was no greater use for its wealth than to provide schools for future
generations, both for the good of the individual child and the good of the
state:
Nothing will have a greater tendency to secure prosperity to the State,
stability to our institutions, and an enlightened state of society, than by
providing for the education of our posterity. Some of the ablest men
we have in the United States are men from the poorest origin, who
have had their minds opened to the advantages of knowledge by public
schools. Educate the children of this country, and you will find in the
halls of the Legislature of California men, able statesmen too, of the
45
poorest origin.

Robert Semple, the president of the constitutional convention, similarly
asked whether any “ha[d] ever seen a school fund sufficiently large to
46
answer every purpose, or secure too great a spread of knowledge[.]”
Delegates emphasized the need of a school system to train children to
use language, to prepare them to be citizens, to help them prepare to face
the conflicts of life, to prepare them for higher education, and to “carry
47
on intelligently and successfully the ordinary labors of life.”
After the 1849 convention, the framers issued a notice “[t]o [t]he
People [o]f California,” where they “respectfully submit[ted] the
48
accompanying plan of government for your approval.” In this notice,
the framers emphasized that:
A knowledge of the laws, their moral force and efficacy [is] an essential
element of freedom, and makes public education of primary importance.
In this view, the Constitution of California provides for and guarantees
in the most ample manner, the establishment of common schools,
seminaries, and colleges, so as to extend the blessings of education
throughout the land, and secure its advantages to the present and
49
future generations.

45. Report of the Debates in the Convention of California, on the Formation of the State
Constitution, in September and October, 1849 204 (1850) [hereinafter 1849 Debates].
46. Id.
47. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1102; 3 Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of California 1412–13 (1881).
48. 1849 Debates, supra note 45, at 474.
49. Id.
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This enthusiasm for public education remained robust in the 1879
constitutional convention. The framers there, many of whom had been
present at the 1849 convention, again engaged in a robust discussion
about what language should be included in the final education provision.
A review of the transcript shows every speaker in favor of a free
education for the children of California. While there was some debate
about whether the free schools guarantee should extend past the
50
“common school” (elementary) level, not one delegate disagreed with
the language establishing the state’s schools, nor with the importance of
educating children. Throughout the debates, the framers referred to
education as the gateway to a robust economic future in the state, the
key to self-governance, and a gateway out of poverty for the individual.
This review supports the idea that a quality school represents the
fulfillment of these ideals.
Chairperson Winans extolled the virtues of public education, as “the
basis of self-government . . . constitut[ing] the very corner stone of
51
republican institutions.” He noted that in articles from the “original
states’” constitutions, the subject of education was merely mentioned,
but did not take the form of a legislative enactment: “[i]t was merely the
52
broad declaration of a high principle.” Yet, “as the time advanced and
the condition of the people improved,” the education clauses finally
53
“attained to the dignity of a complete article in every Constitution.”
The framers of the California Constitution wished to endow the right to
education with constitutional force, and did so in both the 1849 and 1879
versions.
3. The Holmes Amendment
The framers’ robust language in adopting the constitutional
provision, as well as their references to similarly strong provisions in
other states, is persuasive evidence that the framers intended the
education clause to incorporate a qualitative element. There was debate,
however, on one proposed amendment that would have contained the
words “thorough and efficient” in describing the education required
under the constitution. But its rejection did not signal a rejection of a

50. As originally adopted, article IX, section 6 defining public schools “provided that all State
school funds be used exclusively for the support of primary and grammar schools,” and the 1902
amendment “authorized the legislators to vote a special State school tax . . . .” Cloud, supra note 34,
at 103.
51. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087; see also Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 40 (Cal. 1984)
(quoting Winans’s remarks during the 1879 debates and proceedings).
52. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087.
53. Id.
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54

qualitative mandate, as some have suggested. This same amendment
55
would have limited article IX to the “common schools.” The convention
rejected this amendment, preferring to leave the opportunity for the
legislature to provide for higher education.
Samuel A. Holmes, a critic of advanced education, moved to
eliminate the language in section 1 promoting “intellectual, scientific,
moral, and agricultural improvement” by emphasizing simply the system
56
of “common schools.” Holmes advocated striking section 1 and
replacing it with: “The Legislature shall provide a thorough and efficient
system of free schools, whereby all the children of this State may receive
57
58
a good common school education.” As delegate Charles W. Cross
emphasized during the debate, “[t]his amendment proposes the
59
education merely of children.”
Cross characterized the debate over the amendment as representing
two polarized views of the framers: first, those who wanted funding for
education “beyond a certain point, that certain point being an education
in what is usually termed the common English branches,” and those who
believed that “the education of a few to a high grade at the expense of
the State finally proves a benefit to the State, far exceeding the expense
60
of that much education.” He says, “I think [Holmes] will not take issue
with me on this, that this is the point at which we are to determine . . .
whether the State, in its appropriation of public funds, is to be limited to
61
a common school system.” Delegate William F. White, a supporter of
the amendment, also framed the debate as “common” school versus
higher education: “We are now planning for a system of common school
62
education, and if we want another system we must add it on afterward.”
Indeed, this was the urging of Cross, who was in favor of section 1 as it
stood:

54. See Brief for Respondent at 9, Campaign for Quality Educ. v. California, No. A134423 (Cal.
App. Oct. 19, 2012) (“[T]he framers specifically considered and rejected a proposal to impose
qualitative requirements on the Legislature’s support for education . . . .”).
55. John Dinan, The Meaning of State Constitutional Education Clauses: Evidence from the
Constitutional Convention Debates, 70 Alb. L. Rev. 927, 951 (2007); see also 1879 Debates, supra note
35, at 1087.
56. Dinan, supra note 55, at 951.
57. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087.
58. Cross was an attorney from Nevada County. Cloud, supra note 34, at 69.
59. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1088.
62. Id.
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[S]o that whenever the people of this State shall feel like encouraging a
higher intellectual development, they shall have the power to do so.
But if, at any future time in the history of the State, the people wish to
say that the expenditure should be limited to the common school
63
branches, then, sir, the State should have the power to so limit it.

The Holmes Amendment failed. Rather than evincing a debate
between whether schools should be “efficient,” “thorough,” or “good,”
however, or showing that the framers considered and explicitly rejected a
qualitative element to education, this debate instead highlights the
framers’ disagreement over whether the constitution should mandate
only a “common” (grade-level) education, or whether the guarantee
extends to higher education. This, not a discussion of whether California
schools should deliver a quality education, was the crux of the debate.
4. The Debate over Section 1
There was also a larger debate over the legal force of section 1, even
apart from the Holmes Amendment. Although some delegates found the
language lofty and imprecise, others maintained that it contained the
force of law. Ultimately the language about intellectual, scientific, moral,
and agricultural improvement endured, including requiring the
64
legislature to create the school system.
Four delegates dismissed section 1 as merely hortatory. Joseph A.
Filcher remarked that he was opposed to it “simply because there is
65
nothing in it.” Other delegates felt the same way, including Dennis W.
66
Herrington, who said the section is “meaningless,” and Winans, who
67
stated it is “but a declaration of principle . . . general in its character.”
68
Delegate Thomas H. Laine called section 1 a “glittering generality.”
Three more delegates, however, argued that the provision contained
69
the force of law. John T. Wickes argued that the section was not
toothless, saying, “I do not care whether it is called a preamble or not. I
take a Constitution to be a philosophic and historic as well as a legal
70
instrument.” Delegates E.O. Smith and Lucius D. Morse, felt the same,
with Smith remarking:
I am of the same opinion as Dr. Morse, and I am of the opinion that it
means something, too. It provides that it shall be the duty—that the

63. Id.
64. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 26 (“The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.”); Woodbury v. BrownDempsey, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124, 134–36 (2003).
65. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087.
66. Id. at 1089.
67. Id. at 1087.
68. Id.
69. Wickes was a teacher from Nevada County. Cloud, supra note 34, at 69.
70. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1088.
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Legislature shall encourage, by all suitable means, a promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement. This makes
it the duty of the Legislature to forward this matter in every way that the
71
Legislature may have the power to do.

5. Interpreting the Constitutional Debates
It is difficult to separate the debate over section 1 from its context,
namely the debate over Holmes’s Amendment limiting state-funded
education to the “common” subjects. Some have argued that section 1
represents a comparatively weak education provision because that
72
section itself lacks a legislative mandate. When combined with the
mandatory language of section 5, however, California’s provision starts
to look much more like those in states whose courts have found an
adequacy requirement in their constitutions. The far-reaching language
remains in the constitution to this day, commanding the legislature to
establish a system of common schools in order to promote intellectual,
73
scientific, and moral improvement. Those looking to discern the true
intentions of the constitution’s authors and give them effect must find
that the framers placed paramount importance on establishing a system
of schools, which was essential to developing a stable economy, an
74
upwardly mobile populace, and the people’s ability to govern themselves.
From the framers’ debates, one can see California’s founders were
concerned primarily with the citizenship aspects of a good education,
emphasizing the necessity of being able to participate in the political life
of the state. The qualitative mandate inherent in these goals is clear.
C. The Cases
The seminal California education cases are explicit in relying on the
Equal Protection Clause. But underlying these cases are two unavoidable
conclusions: first, that the constitution endows children with a right to
education, and second, that this right means a right to a quality
education. In recent years, scholars have begun to examine the theories
of equal protection and adequacy in tandem, noting that they often
converge in plaintiffs’ complaints and eventual court decisions in a
75
national context. The following analysis shows that the California

71. Id. at 1089.
72. See, e.g., Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation,
28 Harv. J. on Legis. 307, 337 (1991).
73. See Cal. Const. art. I, § 26 (“The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and
prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise.”); Woodbury v. BrownDempsey, 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124, 134–36 (2003).
74. See 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1089.
75. See, e.g., Robert M. Jensen, Advancing Education Through Education Clauses of State
Constitutions, 1997 BYU Educ. & L.J. 1, 27 (1997) (describing “hybrid” equality-adequacy lawsuits as
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Supreme Court has been taking this hybrid approach for years, using the
language (and the practical underpinnings) of adequacy even in
discussions that explicitly focus on equal protection or other constitutional
guarantees. Through discussions about the purposes of a common school
education, the importance of education to the state, or comparing
various school attributes, the supreme court has implicitly recognized the
basic, logical conclusion that schools must be more than school buildings.
1. Two Early Cases (Pre-1971): School Access by Minorities
Throughout its history, the California Supreme Court has been
unwavering in its support of public education as a gateway to independence
and democracy and as a catalyst to economic success. Even as it upheld
separate-but-equal schooling, the court in 1874 held that the quality of a
school was a key element in the constitutional right. In Ward v. Flood,
the court considered whether an African American child could force a
White school to admit her, finding that because the Black school was of
equal quality to the White school, the right was fulfilled with separate76
but-equal schools.
The court’s reasoning had three parts. First, the court established
77
the constitutional right to education. It held that the benefit of
attending a public school is “secured to it under the highest sanction of
positive law,” namely “in obedience to the special command of the
78
Constitution.” The court found that the right to an education, having
been mandated by the constitution, “is, therefore, a righta legal
rightas distinctively so as the vested right in property owned is a legal
right, and as such it is protected, and entitled to be protected by all the
guarantees by which other legal rights are protected and secured to the
79
possessor.” This right, the court reasoned, must be made available to
80
all.
Next, the court discussed the purpose of the schools, namely the
“improvement of [a child’s] mind and the elevation of his moral
condition,” in the “recognized interest of society and of the body politic
81
in the education of its members.” This language sounds remarkably
similar to language contained section 1 of article IX, which was enshrined
five years later in the 1879 constitution.

“using the language of equality as ‘just one measure of adequacy’ to advance the quality of
education”); Joshua E. Weishart, Transcending Equality Versus Adequacy, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 477, 480 (2014).
76. 48 Cal. 36 (1874).
77. Id. at 50.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 51.
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Finally, the court found that separating the races was justified,
because the Black school “afford[ed] equal advantages,” was taught by
“able and efficient teachers,” and was administered “under the same
82
rules and regulations” as the White school. That is, because the school
was of equal quality, forcing Black students into segregated schools did
not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Although its Fourteenth Amendment analysis was eventually
83
repudiated by Brown v. Board of Education, the Ward court’s
discussion of the right to an education remains sound, particularly in its
recognition that the right is inexorably tied to its quality. The court could
have said that the existence of a Black school was enough to fulfill the
right, but it did not—it emphasized the quality of the Black school’s
84
education in safeguarding the right.
Fifty years later, the court again found that the right to an education
of a certain quality, not simply an education, was critical to fulfillment of
the right. In Piper v. Big Pine School District of Inyo County, the court
considered the case of a Native American student who wished to be
admitted to a White school instead of being forced into a federal, native
85
school. The court found that because the federal school was not
supervised by the state board of education, and therefore had no
guarantee of quality, efficiency, or value, such a school would not be the
86
fulfillment of the right under the California Constitution.
The court first held that because the state had no control over the
efficiency and quality of a federal school, there was no way to measure
87
whether the requirements of article IX had been met. The court found
that “[t]he public school system of this state is a product of the studied
thought of the eminent educators of this and other states of the Union,
perfected by years of trial and experience,” describing each grade
88
“form[ing] a working unit in a uniform, comprehensive plan of education.”
The court then reaffirmed the right under the constitution, and its
critical importance to the state:
[T]he common schools are doorways opening into chambers of science,
art, and the learned professions, as well as into fields of industrial and
commercial activities. Opportunities for securing employment are
often more or less dependent upon the rating which a youth, as a pupil
of our public institutions, has received in his school work. These are
89
rights and privileges that cannot be denied.

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 45, 55–57.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Ward, 48 Cal. at 55–57.
226 P. 926 (Cal. 1924).
Id. at 930.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court found that the advantages of school “cannot be enjoyed
as a matter of right by those who, from choice or compulsion, attend
schools without the control, supervision, and regulation of the educational
departments of the state,” that is, without regulations on what and how
90
children are taught.
In a final note, the court dismissed the local school district’s concern
about the cost of educating Native American children. It found that the
courts were not responsible for this cost, and that the “economic question
is no doubt an important matter to the district, but it may very properly be
91
addressed to the legislative department of the state government.”
These early cases show that evaluating the quality of a school,
through indicators such as quality teachers, efficient administration, and
government oversight, is critical to evaluating whether that school is
fulfilling the article IX right. The mere availability of a school, especially a
school with questionable quality, is not sufficient to safeguard the
constitutional guarantee.
2. Serrano v. Priest (1971): “More than Access to a Classroom”
In Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), the court held for the first time that
92
a school financing scheme was subject to strict scrutiny. There, plaintiffs
challenged the state’s school finance scheme that conditioned school
93
funding on local property taxes. The court held that strict scrutiny was
warranted both because education is a fundamental right, and because it
was being apportioned unequally, in violation of the constitution’s Equal
94
Protection Clause.
Reading this case as addressing only equality, however, ignores the
court’s strong language about the importance of education to both the
individual and society, critical to everything from economic development
to political participation. Recognizing the “distinctive and priceless
function of education in our society,” it held that education is a
95
fundamental right under the California Constitution. An unequal
apportionment of funds, it held, infringed this right in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.
Although the bulk of the court’s rights analysis was devoted to equal
protection, the ruling was based again on assumptions about school
quality. The unconstitutionality of the finance scheme was rooted in the

90. Id. at 928.
91. Id. at 930.
92. 487 P.2d 1241, 1249 (Cal. 1971).
93. Id. at 1244.
94. Id. at 1249. Strict scrutiny review in this context requires the state to establish not only that it
has a compelling interest that justifies a given law, but that the distinctions drawn by the law are
necessary to further that compelling interest.
95. Id. at 1258.
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fact that it “classifie[d] its recipients on the basis of their collective
affluence and ma[de] the quality of a child’s education depend upon the
resources of his school district and ultimately upon the pocketbook of his
96
parents.” Because students in poorer districts received a different (and
presumably poorer) quality of education, and because no compelling
state interest justified this, the state’s funding scheme failed the strict
97
scrutiny test. Later, in Serrano II, the court discussed quality at length,
indicating that some of the marks of educational quality include “higher
quality staff, program expansion and variety, beneficial teacher to pupil
ratios and class sizes, modern equipment and materials, and high-quality
98
buildings.”
Imputing a right to a quality education is the only logical conclusion
from this case. It is highly unlikely that, finding education to be a
fundamental right critical to both individual development and the economic
and political health of the state, the court could find no required minimum
quality for such education. The court emphasized the phrase “all the
benefits and detriments that a child may receive from his educational
experience,” even condoning the use of “pupil output as a measure of the
99
quality of a district’s educational program.” Here, too, although the case
was at its heart about unequal spending, that fact cannot be divorced from
the result of the unequal spending at issue: an unequal apportionment of
educational quality. Although the court did not explicitly consider what
quality of education was required in order to reap the “full enjoyment”
of the right, it signaled that “surely the right to an education today means
100
more than access to a classroom.”
3. Butt v. State (1992): What Falls Below the Bar?
In 1991, the Richmond Unified School District announced it would
end the school year six weeks earlier than its scheduled release date, due
101
to a lack of funds. Richmond parents filed for an injunction alleging
that the loss of six weeks of instruction would cause “serious, irreparable
harm to the District’s 31,500 students and would deny them their
‘fundamental right to an effective public education’ under the California
102
Constitution.” The case reached the California Supreme Court, which
emphasized that although local control of schools is a tenet of the
California system, the court will intervene where the actual quality of the
district’s program, viewed as a whole, “falls fundamentally below

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 1263 (emphasis added).
Id.
Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976).
Id.
Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1257.
Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Cal. 1992).
Id. at 1244.
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prevailing statewide standards.” The court’s decision was based in part
on the declarations of “[s]everal District teachers” who outlined the
effects of the closure in the classrooms, including preventing high school
seniors from receiving “intended lessons covering the State’s executive
and judicial branches” and qualifying for college admission; “Algebra I
students would miss essential instruction in quadratic equations”; first
graders would miss instruction in “phonics, reading comprehension,
104
creative writing, handwriting skills,” and so on. The court upheld the
trial court’s finding that the “proposed closure would have a real and
appreciable impact on the affected students’ fundamental California
105
right to basic educational equality.”
Here again, the case was ostensibly about equal access to the
fundamental right to an education. Equality of education, however, was
not truly the issue; this was not an attempt to equalize schools. Indeed,
the court observed that: “[A] requirement that [the State] provide
[strictly] ‘equal’ educational opportunities would thus seem to present an
entirely unworkable standard requiring impossible measurements and
106
comparisons.” The court explicitly found that the California Constitution
does not guarantee uniform “local programs, philosophies, and conditions,”
107
including term lengths.
According to the California Supreme Court, “basic educational
108
equality” was critical. The court did not define what this meant, but
what could the addition of the word “basic” mean other than a minimum
level of educational quality? The court, with the addition of this word,
essentially ruled on what a basic education under the California
Constitution requires: a basic minimal level of educational quality. The
decision was not based on funding; the Richmond School District received
a constitutional level of funding under the state finance scheme. It was
not based on pure equality; the court accepted that local control will
ensure some variation in schools. It was also not based on disobeying the
explicit mandates of the constitution: the school was free, and was longer
than the constitutionally minimum six-month requirement. The text of
109
the constitution requires only six months of school, and indeed, the
110
state argued that six months was all that was required. The court
111
rejected this contention.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 1252.
Id. at 1253, 1253 n.16.
Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1252 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1982)).
Id.
Id. at 1253.
Cal. Const. art. IX, § 5.
Butt, 842 P.2d at 1247.
Id.

F - Gordon_18 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

342

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

2/9/2016 1:36 PM

[Vol. 67:323

The decision therefore rested on the idea that a “basic” education,
one that meets the requirements of the education article, was one that
112
met “prevailing statewide standards.” The court in Butt showed that it
was willing to guarantee a minimum level of schooling for students,
based on the standards, and that it was prepared to ensure that the state
could intervene when a district fails to fulfill its constitutional mandate.
4. Hartzell v. Connell (1984): When a Free School Is Not Free
In Hartzell v. Connell, taxpayers in the Santa Barbara High School
District challenged fees charged by the district for participation in
extracurricular activities, arguing the fees violated the “free school” and
113
equal protection guarantees of the state constitution. Defendants
argued that the fundamental right to an “education” guaranteed
“nothing more than an opportunity to progress from grade to grade and
receive a diploma,” regardless of the programs’ actual educational
114
The court rejected this contention, finding that because
value.
extracurricular activities constitute “a fundamental ingredient of the
115
educational process” they therefore must be offered free of charge.
Here again, the court looked beyond the simple provision of an education,
instead discussing how the features and quality of a district’s program
contribute to the letter and spirit of the constitutional guarantee.
In rejecting the notion that the purpose of an education can be
divorced from its provision, the court talked at length about the purposes
of a quality public education, drawing on sources from Thomas Jefferson
116
to Serrano I. The court specifically called out the role that a “high
117
quality” education plays in participating in the political process. The
court rejected the idea that guaranteeing only the classes offered for
credit fulfilled the free schools mandate, saying this would “sever the
118
concept of education from its purposes.” These purposes, according to
the court, included “the making of good citizens physically, mentally, and
119
morally,” which are “directly linked to the constitutional role of
120
education in preserving democracy, as set forth in article IX, section 1.”
The court, in other words, rejected the notion of an empty gradeprogression education, looked deeply into the purpose of education,

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 1252.
679 P.2d 35, 37 (Cal. 1984).
Id. at 50 (Bird, J., concurring).
Id. at 42.
Id. at 40–41.
Id. at 41.
Id.
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
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cited the need for “high quality” in making good citizens, and found that
the right is fulfilled only where all aspects of the right are provided free.
Interestingly, the equal protection cause of action was not discussed
in the primary opinion of the court. The court based its decision only on
the “free schools” guarantee of article IX, section 5: “The Legislature
shall provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall
be kept up and supported in each district . . . .” This shows that the court
has not confined its rulings to equal protection jurisprudence where a
basic constitutional guarantee remains unfulfilled.
II. Equality v. Adequacy Analysis
As discussed above, notions of quality and adequacy have long been
the foundation of the California Supreme Court’s education jurisprudence,
even where the decision was ostensibly based on equal protection. This is
for good reason. Although equal protection surely played a critical part
in Serrano I, Serrano II, and other groundbreaking decisions, there are
limitations to this doctrine in defining and fulfilling the constitutional
right, both doctrinally and practically.
Doctrinally, there are three primary problems with viewing
education solely in an equal protection context. First, confining
education to an equality-based definition ignores the text and history of
the constitutional provision requiring an education for all children, not
simply an equal education. Second, equal protection does little to solve
the underlying question of what the right entails. It is simply necessary to
consider what the right means in the first place in order to determine
what elements of that right must be apportioned equally to achieve
equality. The court has avoided the question by using the phrase “basic
educational equality” from Butt, implying some kind of baseline, but
never defining it. Without a definition, the court is left with the
piecemeal, case-by-case approach we see today. Finally, equal protection
is a misnomer; in addition to being an unattainable goal, true educational
equality, that is, making all schools equal, has never been the goal of
education litigation. Nor does it alleviate the possibility of “basically
equal” but grossly inadequate schools, something that the court (and the
framers) would surely find problematic.
Practically, equal protection doctrine also has its limitations.
Education has been a fundamental right in California for more than forty
years, yet California schools are currently ranked tenth lowest in the
121
nation. Only about half of schoolchildren pass even the state’s own

121. Dan Walters, California Schools Rank Low—Again—in Education Week Report, Sacramento
Bee (Jan. 10, 2014, 12:25 PM), http://blogs.sacbee.com/capitolalertlatest/2014/01/california-schoolsrank-low---again---in-education-week-report.html.
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122

standards. There is great variation in students’ passage rates even
within demographic and economic categories, where the equal protection
doctrine does not tread. More must be done to realize the framers’ vision
of “extend[ing] the blessings of education throughout the land, and
123
secur[ing] its advantages to the present and future generations.”
A. Equal Protection Cannot Define the Right Without Article IX.
First, viewing the right to education solely as an equal protection
problem ignores the text and history of the constitutional provision,
requiring an education for all children, not simply an equal education. As
Justice Marshall put it in his dissent in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez: “The Equal Protection Clause is not addressed to
the minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state
action. It mandates nothing less than that ‘all persons similarly
124
circumstanced shall be treated alike.’”
In the California Constitution, equal protection has its own
provision, in article I, section 7, separate from article IX’s education
provision. Confining the discussion of article IX only to article I
protections does not give due regard to the specific mandates contained
in the education article, and ignores the explicit and robust constitutional
provision requiring the legislature to establish schools and the goals of
doing so. If education is a fundamental right for equal protection
purposes, education must also be a fundamental right for its own
purposes.
Further, requiring equality but not quality ignores the framers’
intent to educate the children of California. As noted by the Hartzell court,
Winans, chairperson for the convention’s Committee on Education, called
public education “the basis of self-government and [] the very corner
125
stone of republican institutions.” Other framers’ remarks were similarly
126
forceful in stating the importance of education. The framers intended to
enshrine a constitutional provision representing the inherent good of an
education to California, not simply the value of providing a service on an
equal basis.
Equal protection also does nothing to define the right itself. After
Serrano, it is clear that education is a fundamental right and that
disparate treatment is worthy of strict scrutiny, but still no decision has
defined what the right means beyond “more than access to a

122. See Standardized Testing and Reporting (STAR) Results, Cal. Dep’t Educ., http://star.cde.ca.gov/
(last updated July 24, 2014).
123. 1849 Debates, supra note 45, at 474.
124. 411 U.S. 1, 89 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,
253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
125. Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 40 (Cal. 1984) (quoting 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1102).
126. See infra Part II.B.1.
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127

classroom.” Butt did little to clarify it, by demanding only “basic
128
educational equality” and “basic equality of educational opportunity.”
Even these terms obscure more than they clarify: it is unclear which noun
129
the adjective “basic” is meant to qualify. It also “remains unclear
whether this basic equity means equality of basic educational inputs,
basic equality in educational outcomes, basic equality of educational
inputs, basic equality to achieve a certain educational outcome, or some
130
other standard not yet enunciated.” Indeed, “even identical services
and facilities will not afford an equal educational opportunity to students
131
who come to school with sharply different needs and abilities.”
Without these definitions and markers, it is impossible to determine
whether one district’s offering is equal in the relevant sense to another’s.
Without a definition, litigants and lower courts are left without guidance
132
provision of
to evaluate whether districts’ teacher layoff plans,
133
134
educational materials, and school fees, as well as counties’ applications
135
136
of state property taxes and students’ time spent in the classroom
conform with the mandate of equal protection under the law.
Finally, equality does not alleviate the problem of “basically equal”
but grossly inadequate schools. The California Supreme Court addressed
and disallowed this possibility in Serrano I with its admonition that “surely
137
the right to an education today means more than access to a classroom.”
As the Kentucky Supreme Court stated in its groundbreaking opinion
requiring educational adequacy: “We reject [] a definition which could
result in a system of common schools, efficient only in the uniformly
138
deplorable conditions it provides throughout the state.” Yet without

127. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1257 (Cal. 1971).
128. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992).
129. “Basic equality” could mean “forming an essential foundation or starting point” of equality,
which would seemingly mandate fundamental, nonnegotiable equality across programs. It could also
mean, however, “offering or consisting of the minimum required without elaboration or luxury;
simplest or lowest in level” of educational opportunity, mandating only a floor of educational equality,
beyond which districts are free to vary by providing more or better services once this baseline has been
reached. It could also mean, however, that all programs must be roughly equalone program must be
“basically equal” to another.
130. William S. Koski, Achieving “Adequacy” in the Classroom, 27 B.C. Third World L.J. 13, 38
(2007).
131. Peter Enrich, Leaving Equality Behind: New Directions in School Finance Reform, 48 Vand.
L. Rev. 101, 150 (1995).
132. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement,
Reed v. State, No. BC432420, 2011 WL 10893745, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 18–21, 2011).
133. See D.J. v. State, No. BS142775, 2014 WL 4064226, at *4 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 24, 2014).
134. Complaint at 1, Doe v. California, No. BC445151 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2010).
135. See Petition for Writ of Mandate and Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 4–6,
California Dep’t of Fin. v. Grimes, No. 30-2012-00559592 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 5, 2012).
136. Complaint at 1–8, Cruz v. California, No. 14727139 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 29, 2014).
137. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1257 (Cal. 1971).
138. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211 (Ky. 1989).
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guidance on what more is required, or indeed if anything is required at
all, equal schools full of children without basic competency in learning
fundamentals are a very real possibility, and indeed may already exist. As
a number of scholars have noted, “[t]here is nothing in [an equal
protection analysis] . . . that would prevent the state of California, in
meeting its constitutional mandate,” from “equally” failing to fund the
entire education system, for example establishing only one school in each
139
school district. While it may be difficult to envision a state withdrawing
all support for education, there is nothing in the equal protection analysis
140
that would prevent it from doing so. Thus, the schools’ guarantee must
lie in article IX, not simply the equal protection clause.
B. Equal Protection Is Infeasible and Undesirable.
True equality in education is infeasible and undesirable in light of
the large variations in educational priorities, disparities in resources, and
the longstanding principle of local control. Although equality is
appealing in its simplicity, in reality no two educational programs will
ever be truly equal. This is true for a number of reasons. First, true
equality would be enormously complex, if not impossible, to prove and
administer. In the context of education, hundreds of different inputs,
from the training of teachers to the competence of administrators to the
quality of textbooks to the size of a classroom, all affect how a district or
school delivers education; it would be quite simply impossible to equalize
all these factors.
Even considering only school funding, the appropriate dimension
141
for comparison has proven elusive despite decades of litigation. As we
have seen, equalizing funding does not create equal programs, as
“[e]qual expenditures may fail to produce equal schools because of
variations, for example, in [the] efficiency of administration, in resource
allocation decisions, or in the demands placed on schools by their
142
different student populations.” Particularly in California, with marked
differences in cost of living, property tax bases, and demographics, the
same dollar can produce vastly different marginal increases in a child’s
143
education. Some even argue that money is not linked to the quality of
educational outputs at all, and equal funding will not produce anything
139. See John C. Eastman, When Did Education Become a Civil Right? An Assessment of State
Constitutional Provisions for Education 1776–1900, 42 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1, 30 (1998); see also Scott
R. Bauries, Is There an Elephant in the Room?: Judicial Review of Educational Adequacy and the
Separation of Powers in State Constitutions, 61 Ala. L. Rev. 701, 701 (2010); R. Craig Wood,
Constitutional Challenges to State Education Finance Distribution Formulas: Moving from Equity to
Adequacy, 23 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 531, 551 (2004).
140. See Eastman, supra note 139, at 33–34.
141. See Enrich, supra note 131, at 145; McUsic, supra note 72, at 316.
142. Enrich, supra note 131, at 148.
143. See McUsic, supra note 72, at 330 (detailing why education costs differ across school districts).
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144

resembling an equal education. This is a serious problem because
plaintiffs in school finance cases “do not seek equal funding merely for
the sake of equality; they seek to improve the educational opportunities
145
offered by their schools.”
Educational equality is also a politically infeasible goal. California’s
146
legislature has emphasized local control of schools; this local control
will necessarily bring variation. Again turning to the area of funding,
wealthier districts have a vested interested in protecting their ability to
147
spend more money to provide their children with a superior education.
A significant fear exists that in order to achieve equality, the wealthier
districts will either need to restrict their spending or services, or pay for
148
the poorer districts out of their own funds. It also “threatens the wealthy
districts’ ability to give their children an advantage in the competition for
post-school opportunities,” for which they are willing to spend a great
149
deal of their own wealth. It would likely be impossible to disallow this
spending, but equally impossible to bring every school district in the state
150
up to the spending levels of the wealthiest districts.
Moreover, simply equalizing per-pupil funding might not produce
better educational opportunities for disadvantaged children because
education costs for these children are higher than the costs for other

144. Aaron Saiger, Note, Disestablishing Local School Districts as a Remedy for Educational
Inadequacy, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1830, 1837–38 (1999) (citing Eric A. Hanushek, Conclusions and
Controversies About the Effectiveness of School Resources, 4 Fed. Res. Bank N.Y. Econ. Pol’y Rev.
11, 22 (1998) (“Simply providing more funding or a different distribution of funding [to schools] is
unlikely to improve student achievement . . . .”).
145. Noreen O’Grady, Toward a Thorough and Efficient Education: Resurrecting the Pennsylvania
Education Clause, 67 Temp. L. Rev. 613, 631 (1994) (citing Richard J. Stark, Education Reform:
Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutions’ Education Finance Provisions—Adequacy vs. Equality,
1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 609, 613–14).
146. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1254 (Cal. 1992) (quoting Cal. Const. art. IX, §§ 6 1/2, 14).
147. Enrich, supra note 131, at 156.
148. See id. at 156–57; Michael Heise, Litigated Learning and the Limits of Law, 57 Vand. L. Rev.
2417, 2439 (2004) (“Local citizens, especially parents, do not like to be told that they cannot raise and
spend local revenues on their own schools. Many like even less the idea that their locally raised
revenues might be redirected to schools throughout the rest of the state.”); McUsic, supra note 72, at
328–29 (“In the past the legislative response to court-ordered school finance reform has been
inadequate, in part, because property rich districts have ‘impede[d] the efforts of the poorer districts’
citizens to secure a satisfactory legislative remedy,’” in part because of the threat of wealth transfer
from rich to poor districts.).
149. Enrich, supra note 131, at 158; see also Rob Reich, Not Very Giving, N.Y. Times (Sept. 4,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/not-very-giving.html (describing how the town of
Hillsborough on the San Francisco peninsula raised an additional $2300 per pupil in 2012 through
private contributions, compared to Oakland and San Francisco district foundations, which raised less
than $100 extra per child).
150. See William H. Clune, New Answers to Hard Questions Posed by Rodriguez: Ending the
Separation of School Finance and Educational Policy by Bridging the Gap Between Wrong and
Remedy, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 721, 754 (1992).
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151

children. For example, “students with low English proficiency or little
[family] support . . . require more . . . education[al services] . . . to reach
152
the same achievement level as [more advantaged students].” These
variations in education costs to reach equal achievement further
demonstrate the infeasibility of evaluating education under an equal
protection framework.
C. Adequacy More Appropriately Addresses Societal Goals.
Focusing on adequacy has a number of benefits. Among other
benefits, the adequacy approach is “grounded in broadly shared societal
values concerning the importance of education and the obligation to provide
153
for the basic needs of society’s least advantaged.”
Adequacy is appealing because it does not threaten to lower the
level of achievement or spending in some districts in an effort to create
154
155
equality. Indeed, some equal protection cases, such as Abbott v. Burke II
in New Jersey, specifically brought about the kind of wealth distribution not
156
required by an adequacy approach. An adequacy analysis does not
necessitate defining and comparing different groups within the system; it
157
therefore does not require redistribution.
158
Adequacy also addresses the societal goal of equity. In states
where plaintiffs in adequacy cases have won, the court has defined an
“adequate” education as “sufficient to prepare all students, no matter
159
their starting points, to compete equally in the world.” This language
160
“shows adequacy suits’ intent to reach equity.” Adequacy is even
better than equal protection in achieving equity because it can create
systems where disparities are diminished by giving more to students who
161
need more; “equality can only make things even.” For example, a true
151. Heise, supra note 148, at 2441 (noting that equity-based litigation disfavors urban districts
with high per-pupil funding levels); Stark, supra note 145, at 657 (“To compensate for the effects of
poverty . . . poor children required greater educational resources than affluent children.”).
152. McUsic, supra note 72, at 329; see also id. at 330 (noting that urban districts must pay higher
teacher salaries and higher site and construction costs).
153. Enrich, supra note 131, at 170.
154. Id.; McUsic, supra note 72, at 328–29.
155. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
156. Phil Weiser, What’s Quality Got to Do with It?: Constitutional Theory, Politics, and Education
Reform, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 745, 774 (1995) (responding to litigation with “targeted aid
to an additional two school districts and capped the spending of wealthier districts in order to realize
greater distributional equity”).
157. Id. at 758.
158. Meaghan Field, Justice as Fairness: The Equitable Foundations of Adequacy Litigation,
12 Scholar 403, 407 (2010).
159. Id. at 410 (citing Deborah A. Verstegen, Towards a Theory of Adequacy: The Continuing
Saga of Equal Educational Opportunity in the Context of State Constitutional Challenges to School
Finance Systems, 23 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. 499, 508, 51112, 523 (2004)).
160. Id.
161. Field, supra note 158, at 410 n.29.
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equity-based analysis could give $5000 to every child in the state, and
likely pass a constitutional equity challenge, whether or not some
students actually need $7000 in order to achieve basic literacy and
numeracy given their learning needs. Adequacy’s true concern is equality
of opportunity, not equality of resources (even if that is facially what the
claim asks for) because the resources consist of what each student needs
to reach the state-imposed standards, even if those needs differ
162
immensely. A truly adequate education may in fact demand something
163
other than equal resources.
D. Adequacy Is the Only Way to Guarantee the Right.
Without a right to a quality education, the right to education is
hollow. The right to counsel is a useful comparison. Article I, section 15
164
of the California Constitution guarantees a right to counsel. As both
the U.S. and the California Supreme Court have found, this right to
165
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel. The U.S.
Supreme Court has found that the right to a fair trial is contained not
only in the Due Process Clauses, but independently through the right to
166
counsel in the Sixth Amendment. The Supreme Court has also affirmed
167
that this right is not conditioned on wealth. The right to counsel,
however, is not satisfied simply if a “lawyer is present at trial alongside
168
the accused.” The constitutional mandate is fulfilled only where
169
counsel renders “adequate legal assistance.”
Similarly, article IX of the California Constitution guarantees a right
170
to education. As this Article argues, this right is guaranteed not only by
the equal protection clause, but independently through the education
clause itself. The California Supreme Court has also found that the right
171
to an education cannot be conditioned on wealth. Finally, the right to
172
an education is not satisfied simply by “access to a classroom.”
The parallels between the right to adequate counsel and a right to
adequate education have not gone unnoticed by the California Supreme
Court; the court compared the two in its first Serrano decision, and even

162. Id. at 410–11.
163. Mildred Wigfall Robinson, Financing Adequate Educational Opportunity, 14 J.L. & Pol. 483,
500 (1998).
164. Cal. Const. art. I, § 15.
165. In re Valdez, 233 P.3d 1049, 1059 (Cal. 2010) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
686 (1984)).
166. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684–85.
167. Id. at 685 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 686 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980)).
170. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Cal. 1971).
171. Id. at 1257.
172. Id.
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noted that “from a larger perspective, education may have far greater
173
social significance” than the right to a fair trial. There are limits to
trying to reproduce Sixth Amendment jurisprudence within the context
of education (no one has ever been able to plead “ineffective assistance
of teacher,” for example). Pointing out the parallels, however, serves to
highlight that the supreme court has found that the only way to fulfill the
right to counsel is to guarantee adequacy; it should do the same with the
right to education. The court should not continue to affirm a
fundamental right, as held in Serrano, while also finding that article IX
holds no qualitative mandate.
III. Other States’ Courts
Other states’ high courts have dealt with interpreting their
education clauses, some substantially similar to California’s provisions.
California courts may look to the decisions of other state courts that have
interpreted similar constitutional provisions because where “words are
used which are employed in a certain sense in the constitutions or
statutes of other States . . . , it is proper to consider them as employed in
174
the same sense in our Constitution.” The California Supreme Court has
repeatedly looked to other states’ interpretations of similar provisions in
their constitutions, particularly in the context of the free schools
175
Moreover, California’s constitutional framers explicitly
provision.
stated that the language of the education clause was taken from other
176
states’ constitutions. Because of this heavy borrowing, logic dictates
that a clause that appears in all of the constitutions should be interpreted
177
in a roughly uniform fashion.
Nearly every state’s education article contains language that
resembles the language in the California Constitution. One category of
cases adds words such as “thorough,” “complete,” and “efficient” to the
establishment of a school system, but otherwise look similar to California’s
178
own article. Another category resembles California’s article 9, section 1
(regarding the promotion of intellectual and scientific goals), articulating
179
Still another
goals beyond the simple establishment of schools.

173. Id. at 1257–58.
174. See Cty. of Sacramento v. Hickman, 428 P.2d 593, 599 (Cal. 1967).
175. See Arcadia Unified Sch. Dist. v. State Dep’t of Educ., 825 P.2d 438, 443 (Cal. 1992); Hartzell v.
Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 38–44 (Cal. 1984).
176. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087.
177. Noreen O’Grady, supra note 145, at 630 (citing McUsic, supra note 72, at 312).
178. See, e.g., Ark. Const. art. XIV, § 1; Colo. Const. art. IX, § 2; Idaho Const. art. IX, § 1; Ky.
Const. § 183; N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 4, para. 1; Ohio Const. art. VI, § 2; S.D. Const. art. VIII, § 15;
Tex. Const. art. VII, § 1; Wash. Const. art. IX, § 1; W. Va. Const. art. XII, § 1; Wyo. Const. art. VII, § 1.
179. See, e.g., Mass. Const. pt. 2, ch. 5, § 2 (“Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue, diffused
generally among the body of the people, being necessary for the preservation of their rights and
liberties; . . . it shall be the duty of legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this
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category looks like California’s article I, section 5: “The Legislature shall
provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be
kept up and supported in each district at least six months in every year,
180
after the first year in which a school has been established.”
Because of these variations, there are limits to the utility of
comparing other states’ provisions to that of California. First, it is
difficult to compare other states’ provisions because of these variations,
including the use of the terms “thorough,” “efficient,” or both.
California’s article IX, section 5 states only: “The Legislature shall
provide for a system of common schools by which a free school shall be
kept up and supported in each district at least six months in every year,
181
after the first year in which a school has been established.”
Second, California’s education rights doctrine does not easily
compare to other states’ doctrines because in California, the supreme
182
court has long held that education is a fundamental right. This right has
not been so clearly established in every state.
Despite these limitations, a review of other states’ decisions reveals
that there is a movement in favor of finding a substantive, qualitative
right to education under state constitutions. “The highest courts of at
least fourteen states . . . have declared that education is a fundamental
183
right under their state constitutions.” Twenty-two have held that there
commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the sciences, and all seminaries of
them . . . .”); Mont. Const. art. X, § 1 (indicating that the legislature shall provide a basic system of
free quality public elementary and secondary schools); N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. LXXXIII (substantially
similar to Massachusetts’).
180. See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. XI, § 1 (“The legislature shall enact such laws as shall provide for
the establishment and maintenance of a general and uniform public school system.”); Conn. Const.
art. VIII, § 1 (“There shall always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The
general assembly shall implement this principle by appropriate legislation.”); Kan. Const. art. VI, § 1
(“The legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement by
establishing and maintaining public schools, educational institutions and related activities which may
be organized and changed in such manner as may be provided by law.”); Minn. Const. art. XIII; § 1
(“The stability of a republican form of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the
people, it shall be the duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public
schools.”); N.C. Const. art. IX, §§ 1–2 (“Religion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good
government and the happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education shall forever
be encouraged. . . . The General Assembly shall provide . . . for a general and uniform system of free
public schools . . . .”); S.C. Const. art. XI, § 3 (“The General Assembly shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a system of free public schools open to all children in the State and shall
establish, organize and support such other public institutions of learning, as may be desirable.”);
Vt. Const. ch. 2, § 68 (“[A] competent number of schools ought to be maintained in each town unless
the general assembly permits other provisions for the convenient instruction of youth.”); Wis. Const.
art. X, § 3 (“The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools.”).
181. Cal. Const. art. IX, § 5.
182. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1258 (Cal. 1971).
183. Ken Gormley, Education as a Fundamental Right: Building a New Paradigm, 2 F. on Pub.
Pol’y 207, 219 n.63 (2006) (listing Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota,
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as
declaring education a fundamental right).
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is a substantive guarantee underlying their states’ education clauses,
184
often where plaintiffs alleged inadequate funding.
In the minority of states that have declined to find a right to
adequacy, their supreme courts have never found education to be a
185
fundamental right. The Indiana and Rhode Island supreme courts, for
example, rejected claims that their constitutional provisions required any
kind of minimum adequate quality of schooling, but did so while finding
186
no right to education at all. California, of course, has found a right to
187
education. The conclusion from this review is that no supreme court
has ever found its education clause to contain a substantive right to an
education with no corresponding guarantee of quality. The flip side,
curiously enough, has happened: the Montana Supreme Court refused to
rule on whether its state’s constitution conferred a fundamental right to
education, even while finding Montana’s school funding system
188
unconstitutional.
What we learn from these cases is that only a minority of states have
found that their education clauses confer no substantive right. Where a
state’s high court has found a right to education, none has found that

184. Arizona: Roosevelt Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 823 (Ariz. 1994);
Arkansas: Tucker v. Lake View Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cty., 917 S.W.2d 530, 696 (Ark. 1996);
Colorado: Lobato v. People, 218 P.3d 358, 374 (Colo. 2009) (en banc); Connecticut: Conn. Coal. for
Justice in Educ. Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 990 A.2d 206, 233 (Conn. 2010); Idaho: Idaho Schs. for Equal
Educ. Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d 913, 914 (Idaho 1998); Kansas: Montoy v. State, 120 P.3d 306, 308
(Kan. 2005); Kentucky: Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 194 (Ky. 1989);
Massachusetts: McDuffy v. Sec’y of Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 517 (Mass. 1993); Montana:
Columbia Falls Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 6 v. State, 109 P.3d 257, 310 (Mont. 2005); New Hampshire:
Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1355 (N.H. 1997); New Jersey: Abbott v. Burke,
575 A.2d 359, 405 (N.J. 1990); New York: Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326,
331 (N.Y. 2003); North Carolina: Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997); Ohio: DeRolph v.
State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 737 (Ohio 1997); South Carolina: Abbeville Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d
535, 540 (S.C. 1999); South Dakota: Davis v. State, 804 N.W.2d 618, 624 (S.D. 2011); Texas: Edgewood
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989); Vermont: Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d 384,
390 (Vt. 1997); Wisconsin: Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 397 (Wis. 2000); Washington: Seattle
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 85–86 (Wash. 1978); McCleary v. State, 269 P.3d 227, 23031
(Wash. 2012); West Virginia: Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 870 (W.Va. 1979); Wyoming: Campbell
Cty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1263 (Wyo. 1995).
185. Illinois: Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1195 (Ill. 1996) (same); Indiana:
Bonner ex rel. Bonner v. Daniels, 907 N.E.2d 516, 522 (Ind. 2009) (finding a duty for the legislature but
no right or adequacy guarantee); Maryland: Hornbeck v. Somerset Cty. Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758,
786 (Md. 1983); Nebraska: Nebraska Coal. for Educ. Equity & Adequacy v. Heineman, 731 N.W.2d
164, 179 (Neb. 2007) (noting that voters had also rejected a 1996 constitutional amendment that would
have ensured a “quality” education).
186. Bonner, 907 N.E.2d at 522 (finding that the constitution “does not speak in terms of a right or
entitlement to education,” therefore no right under the constitution “to be educated to a certain
quality or other output standard”); City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 55 (R.I. 1995) (“The
education clause confers no such right [to an education], nor does it guarantee an ‘equal, adequate,
and meaningful education.’”).
187. See Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1248–49.
188. Columbia Falls, 109 P.3d at 261.
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right to exist without a guarantee of quality. Decades ago, the California
Supreme Court established a fundamental right to education in Serrano.
To find that there is no corresponding adequacy guarantee would not
only put California at odds with other states’ interpretations of their
189
education clauses, it would render Serrano hollow. Unless the supreme
court overrules Serrano, the continued viability of the right and its
interaction with a right to an adequate education are inextricable.
IV. The Way Forward: Standards-Based Adequacy Evaluation
Establishing the right to an adequate education, as this Article seeks
to do, is far from the end of the inquiry. When deciding an education
adequacy case, a court must take three steps: (1) defining the meaning of
a constitutionally adequate education; (2) determining how to objectively
measure whether a school system is adequate; and (3) deciding on a
190
remedy. This Article does not purport to define the best way to apply
this analysis; it seeks merely to prove the existence of the right and
present a constitutionally-appropriate way to address questions about its
substance. Part IV also aims to dismiss any separation of powers
concerns.
A. Separation of Powers Concerns
In one adequacy-based case pending before the California Court of
Appeal, the State alleges that any adequacy challenges under article IX
191
The
are nonjusticiable intrusions upon the legislative domain.
argument is based on article IX’s instruction that the state legislature
“shall provide” for a system of common schools. The court should reject
this idea because the doctrine of separation of powers in California has
never been subject to a strict formalistic interpretation.
As scholars have noted, since the 1850s the California Supreme
Court has not adhered to a formal separation of executive, legislative,
192
and judicial powers. Instead, it has adopted a “core powers analysis,”

189. Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Emp’t & Hous. Comm’n, 743 P.2d 1323, 1387 (Cal. 1987) (“Where
uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular
interpretation.”).
190. Josh Kagan, A Civics Action: Interpreting “Adequacy” in State Constitutions’ Education
Clauses, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2241, 2245 (2003).
191. See Brief for Respondent at 32, Campaign for Quality Educ. v. State, No. A134423, 2012 WL
5846476 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2012) (arguing that plaintiffs’ adequacy claims are “nonjusticiable
because they are matters within the exclusive province of the Legislature”).
192. See David A. Carrillo & Danny Y. Chou, California Constitutional Law: Separation of
Powers, 45 U.S.F. L. Rev. 655, 672 (2011) (citing Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, 913 P.2d
1046, 1054 (Cal. 1996)) (recognizing substantial interdependence by the branches is a fulfillment, not
an obstacle, to the “checks and balances” safeguarded by the separation of powers doctrine).
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where an action is unconstitutional only where the actions of one branch
193
“materially impairs” the core powers or functions of another branch.
“Under [this] analysis, courts first determine whether the acts of one
branch implicate the ‘core zone of authority’ or powers of another
194
branch.” Looking here at the education clause, one can assume that a
core power is implicated because the legislature is assigned with the duty
195
to “encourage” and “provide for” schools. However, the analysis does
not stop there. Courts then determine whether that power has been
196
materially impaired. Reviewing a legislative action for constitutionality,
or even imposing reasonable regulations does not materially impair the
legislature’s duty, and does not control the exercise of legislative
discretion; it merely limits that discretion in conformance with the
197
California Constitution.
As the court said in Butt, the State, acting through the supreme
court, is the ultimate guarantor of the constitutional right to education
198
under the California Constitution. There, the court noted that “the
State’s ultimate responsibility for public education cannot be delegated
199
to any other entity.” It found that “[t]he Constitution has always vested
‘plenary’ power over education not in the districts, but in the State,
through its Legislature . . . . The legislative decision to emphasize local
administration does not end the State’s constitutional responsibility for
200
basic equality in the operation of its common school system.” Therefore,
under both supreme court precedent and a core powers analysis, the
supreme court is well within its constitutional mandate in reviewing
education clause claims.
This conforms with other states’ supreme courts’ holdings: once they
have found a fundamental right to education under their education
clauses, they have also found that the supreme court can guarantee that
201
right. As the California Supreme Court itself has held, “[i]f the
Legislature were at liberty to avoid the behests of the Constitution by
resolution or law, it would become supreme, and its exposition of that
202
instrument would be final and conclusive.” Finding the issue to be

193. Id. at 656.
194. Id. at 680.
195. Cal Const. art. IX, §§ 1, 5.
196. Carrillo & Chou, supra note 192, at 656.
197. Id. at 686.
198. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1243 (Cal. 1992).
199. Id. at 1248.
200. Id. at 1254.
201. See Neeley v. West Orange-Cove, 176 S.W.3d 746, 776 (Tex. 2005) (“This is not an area in
which the Constitution vests exclusive discretion in the legislature . . . but instead is accompanied by
standards. By express constitutional mandate, the legislature must make ‘suitable’ provision for an
‘efficient’ system for the ‘essential’ purpose of a ‘general diffusion of knowledge.’”).
202. Nogues v. Douglass, 7 Cal. 65, 78 (1857).
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outside the province of the courts would hollow out the right itself. The
right to education in California is fundamental. To guarantee that right
with no way to enforce it would amount to a right without a remedy,
203
violating an elementary principle in legal jurisprudence.
B. Defining Adequacy Under the California Constitution
Finding a justiciable right, the court should then outline its standard
for what constitutes an adequate education. State education clause
litigation has typically resulted in three broad definitions of adequacy:
(1) those that articulate a vague and broad qualitative standard aimed at
furthering the state’s interest in producing civic-minded and economically
productive students but provide little guidance to policymakers; (2) those
that identify specific . . . capacities and skills that all children should
receive from public education to serve both the state’s and the students’
individual interests . . . ; and (3) those that tie adequacy to state
educational content standards, which define with a high degree of
204
specificity what all children should know and be able to do.

But none of these is sufficient to define what the right to education
means within the context of California history and precedent. There is a
fourth option, based on Justice Liu’s article Education, Equality, and
205
National Citizenship, as well as the history and jurisprudence of this
state. This method requires sufficient education to enable citizens to
develop a stable economy, become upwardly mobile, and engage in selfgovernment, such that they are able to participate in the political life of
the state.
1. Broad Constitutional Standard
Butt provides an example of a broad standard that affirms the right
but gives little guidance to courts or the legislature for how to implement
it. Butt held that the constitution requires “basic equality of educational
206
opportunity,” which this Article argues must be a nod to a basic
educational standard. The advantage of this approach is that it is flexible;
it does not risk enshrining any one vision of education, and leaves
localities with the ability to fashion their own programs. The
disadvantage of this approach, however, is that these broad and vague
statements do little to guarantee a quality education. Butt has been law

203. See Peck v. Jenness 48 U.S. 612, 623 (1849) (“A legal right without a remedy would be an
anomaly in the law.”); Barquis v. Merchs. Collection Ass’n., 496 P.2d 817, 830 (Cal. 1972) (“There is a
maxim as old as law that there can be no right without a remedy . . . .”); Am. Philatelic Soc’y v.
Claibourne, 46 P.2d 135, 140 (Cal. 1935) (same); Nougues, 7 Cal. at 80 (“It is a rule as old as the law
itself, that there is no right without a remedy, and wrong without a redress . . . .”).
204. William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in
Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 Emory L.J. 545, 562 (2006).
205. Liu, supra note 13.
206. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992).
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since 1992, and still, California students continue to score at nearly the
bottom of the rankings of nationwide measurements of math and
207
reading. It also leads to a “guess-and-check” approach to education
jurisprudence, which keeps litigants, legislators, and courts tied up for
208
years trying to find what is constitutional. The broad standard has done
little to define, and therefore guarantee, the right.
2. Court-Defined Minimum Education Requirements
The court could instead adopt a definition of adequacy like that
provided by Kentucky in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc. In
Rose, the Kentucky Supreme Court addressed its constitution’s education
clause, which simply provided: “The General Assembly shall, by
appropriate legislation, provide for an efficient system of common schools
209
throughout the State.” The court held that this language required the
legislature to establish a system of common schools “that provides an
210
equal opportunity for children to have an adequate education.”
The Rose court announced that an adequate education must contain
the following seven “capacities:”
[A]n efficient system of education must have as its goal to provide each
and every child with at least the seven following capacities: (i) sufficient
oral and written communication skills to enable students to function in a
complex and rapidly changing civilization; (ii) sufficient knowledge of
economic, social, and political systems to enable the student to make
informed choices; (iii) sufficient understanding of governmental processes
to enable the student to understand the issues that affect his or her
community, state, and nation; (iv) sufficient self-knowledge and
knowledge of his or her mental and physical wellness; (v) sufficient
grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate his or her
cultural and historical heritage; (vi) sufficient training or preparation
for advanced training in either academic or vocational fields so as to
enable each child to choose and pursue life work intelligently; and
(vii) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public
school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in
211
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.

207. See California NAEP Results, Cal. Dep’t Educ., http://www.cde.ca.gov/ta/tg/nr/caresults.asp (last
visited Feb. 8, 2016); see also Jan Mabry, California Students Rank Near Bottom in Math, Reading on
Standardized Tests, CBS SF Bay Area (Oct. 28, 2015), http://sanfrancisco.cbslocal.com/2015/10/28/
california-students-rank-near-bottom-in-math-reading-on-standardized-tests/.
208. See the Abbott cases, currently in their twentieth trip to the New Jersey Supreme Court in
over more than two decades. Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376 (N.J. 1985); Abbott ex rel. Abbott v.
Burke, 20 A.3d 1018, 1023 (2011).
209. Rose v. Council for Better Ed., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 200 (Ky. 1989).
210. Id. at 211.
211. Id. at 212. Courts sometimes combine the last two of these seven goals. See, e.g., Gannon v.
State, 319 P.3d 1196, 1233 (Kan. 2014).

F - Gordon_18 (Dukanovic).doc (Do Not Delete)

February 2016]

2/9/2016 1:36 PM

THE RIGHT TO AN ADEQUATE EDUCATION

357

Following Rose, a number of courts have adopted this approach,
212
including the Kansas Supreme Court earlier last year.
The advantage of this approach is clear direction to the legislature
of what the constitutional minimum bar is. It provides guidance to lower
courts about the minimum floor below which a constitutionally adequate
education plan may not fall, as well as a reference point to localities
wishing to provide constitutionally appropriate educations to their
children. It also has the advantage of conforming much more closely to the
article IX, section 1 goal of fostering “the promotion of intellectual,
scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement,” instead of simply
“ke[eping] up and support[ing]” a system of free schools (which it does
213
implicitly).
One criticism of this approach is that it constitutes legislating from
the bench, intruding on the province of the legislature and the longstanding preference for local control of schools. But the legislature itself,
with little guidance from the courts, has already adopted standards that
look considerably like the seven Rose “capacities.” The Rose capacities
resemble content standards already present in the California Education
Code, including:
(1) English-Language Arts Content Standards for California
214
Public Schools (emphasizing students who are college and career
ready in reading, writing, speaking and listening, and language in order
to, among other skills, demonstrate independence, build strong content
knowledge, comprehend and critique, value evidence, and understand
215
other perspectives and cultures).
(2) History-Social Science Content Standards for California
216
Public Schools (“[N]ot only to acquire core knowledge in history and
social science, but also to develop the critical thinking skills that historians
and social scientists employ to study the past and its relationship to the
present,” including teaching students to “approach subject matter as
217
historians, geographers, economists, and political scientists.”).

212. Gannon, 319 P.3d at 1237–38; see also McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615
N.E.2d 516, 554 (Mass. 1993); Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1359 (N.H. 1997);
Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (N.C. 1997); Abbeville Cty. School Dist. v. State, 515 S.E.2d 535,
540 (S.C. 1999).
213. Cal. Const. art. IX, §§ 1, 5.
214. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., California Common Core State Standards: English Language Arts
and Literacy in History/Social Studies, Science, and Technical Subjects 9–78 (2013),
http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/documents/finalelaccssstandards.pdf.
215. Id. at 6.
216. See Cal. Dep’t of Educ., History-Social Science Content Standards for California
Public Schools: Kindergarten Through Grade Twelve (2000), http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/documents/
histsocscistnd.pdf.
217. Id. at 1–2.
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(3) History-Social Science Content Standards for California
218
Public Schools (including studying U.S. and world government
institutions, history, and practices in grades two, three, four, five, six,
219
eight, ten, eleven, and twelve).
(4) Health Education Content Standards for California Public
220
Schools (including understanding health enhancing concepts, analyzing
influences that affect health, accessing and analyzing health information,
using communication skills, decisionmaking, and goal setting to enhance
health, among other areas).
(5) Visual and Performing Arts Content Standards (including
proficiency in artistic perception; creative expression; historical and
cultural context; aesthetic valuing; and connections, relationships, and
221
applications of art across subject areas).
(6) Career Technical Education Standards for California Public
222
Schools (including developing curriculum to ensure that students are
223
career and college ready and to prepare them for future careers).
(7) Career Technical Education Standards for California Public
Schools (including the goal of preparing graduates to successfully compete
224
in the global economy).

Given the overlap between the Rose factors and California’s own
content standards, adopting an explicitly Rose-like approach has the
advantage of requiring no changes in the content standards as they are
currently constituted. There are additional content standards in the
California Education Code as well; this is as it should be. The
constitutionally required minimum is a floor, not a ceiling.
One criticism of this approach is that it is focused on inputs. Discussions
225
of educational inputs usually focus on funding and resources. While
equalizing these inputs sounds appealing at first, such an approach could
result in reducing educational resources for all in order to ensure equal
226
funding. Moreover, “equal financial inputs do not yield equal resources,”
and “equal funding may not translate into equal education, insofar as the

218. See generally id.
219. Id. at 8–10, 12, 14, 15, 26, 33–35, 38, 42, 45, 47, 50, 54–60.
220. See generally Cal. Dep’t of Educ., Health Education Content Standards for California
Public Schools, Kindergarten Through Grade Twelve (2009), www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/documents/
healthstandmar08.pdf.
221. Nine Through Twelve-Proficient, Visual and Performing Arts: Visual Arts Content Standards,
Cal. Dep’t Educ., http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/vaproficient.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
222. CTE Model Curriculum Standards, Cal. Dep’t Educ., http://www.cde.ca.gov/ci/ct/sf/
ctemcstandards.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
223. Cal. Dep’t of Educ., California Career Technical Education Model Curriculum
Standards 1 (2013), http://www.cde.ca.gov/ci/ct/sf/documents/ctestdfrontpages.pdf.
224. Id. at ii.
225. Julie Zwibelman, Broadening the Scope of School Finance and Resource Comparability
Litigation, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 527, 558 (2001).
226. Debra Satz, Equality, Adequacy, and Educational Policy, 3 Educ. Fin. & Pol’y 424, 426–27 (2008).
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school’s organization and infrastructure ensure that the money is badly
227
spent.”
Output measures, by contrast, look to the graduation rate, the
dropout rate, the skill level of students who enter state higher education
228
systems, and students’ test results. A focus only on inputs or only on
outputs does not adequately measure educational quality. In order to
ensure a quality education, officials should consider both inputs and
outputs when measuring school progress.
3. Legislatively-Based Minimums
The third option is looking to the legislature’s content standards, or
the legislature’s own definition of the right, as the constitutional
229
benchmark of an adequate education. This standard, which focuses on
“outputs” such as learning benchmarks rather than “inputs” such as
school financing, proposes that courts should look to state-developed
content standards as the constitutional standard of adequacy, declare any
system where students are not meeting them unconstitutional, and order
230
that student achievement be brought up to the articulated standards.
This approach is advantageous because “it cannot be readily accused of
intruding upon separation of powers insofar as those educational content
standards have been legislatively authorized and (at least tacitly)
231
approved.” Moreover, state content standards are robust and statespecific, reflecting the legislature’s (and by extension, the people’s)
priorities in what constitutes an adequate education.
The drawbacks to this approach, however, outweigh its advantages.
First, as a matter of state constitutional jurisprudence, if the court used
this approach, it would be abdicating its constitutional authority by
allowing the legislature to define what article IX means. Such an
approach has no support in the state constitution. Although the
California Constitution instructs the legislature to establish a system of
common schools, nowhere does it cede the power to define the right. The
legislature allocates funding, reviews and updates statewide curriculum,
certifies teachers, and oversees school facilities upkeep, but all this
speaks to its ability to fulfill the minimum statewide standards, not to
define them.

227. Id.; see also Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976) (“[A]n equal
expenditure level per pupil in every district is not educationally sound or desirable because of differing
educational needs . . . .”).
228. Satz, supra note 226, at 426–27.
229. See DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 747 (Ohio 1997) (directing the state legislature to
define adequacy); McUsic, supra note 72, at 337.
230. McUsic, supra note 72, at 330.
231. Koski & Reich, supra note 204, at 564 (citing William S. Koski, Educational Opportunity and
Accountability in an Era of Standards-Based School Reform, 12 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 301, 307 (2001)).
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In addition to being constitutionally suspect, a standards-based
approach prevents the court from acting as a backstop to prevent the
legislature from defining the right in such a way that it amounts to no
232
The highest courts of both Texas and New York
right at all.
acknowledged this problem, retaining in the judiciary the ultimate power
233
to determine what the right entails.
There are additional practical difficulties with constitutionalizing
state standards. State standards, particularly California’s, are robust,
covering the entire range of K12 curriculum, including EnglishLanguage Arts, Mathematics, English Language Development, Career
Technical Education, Health Education, History-Social Science, Physical
Education, Science, Visual and Performing Arts, World Language, and
234
guidelines for a Model School Library. While commendable, it is
difficult to connect some of these goals either to article IX (education to
“further intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement”), or
235
to the history of the education clauses. The requirements for health
education or physical education, for example, might be best practices in
education standards, but this does not automatically entitle them to
constitutional significance.
The California legislature should be encouraged to adopt robust
state standards for education, and change them where appropriate,
without fear that such new standards would create new causes of action
in state courts. For example, if this year’s state standards mandate a
certain student to teacher ratio as a benchmark of quality education and
then next year’s mandate adjusts that standard to create larger class sizes,
could every child in a newly overcrowded classroom sue for a smaller
class? If the right to an adequate education is tied directly to the state
standards, there is little reason why not. Rather than encouraging the
legislature to experiment with state standards in an effort to create a
cutting-edge education system, this doctrine could create an unintentional
236
“incentive[] for the legislature to water down [its own] standards.”

232. William S. Koski, Of Fuzzy Standards and Institutional Constraints: A Re-examination of the
Jurisprudential History of Educational Finance Reform Litigation, 43 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1185, 1241
(2003).
233. Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 801 N.E.2d 326, 332 (N.Y. 2003) (“[S]o to enshrine
the Learning Standards would be to cede to a state agency the power to define a constitutional
right.”); Neeley v. West Orange-Cove, 176 S.W.3d 746, 784 (Tex. 2005); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Meno (Edgewood IV), 917 S.W.2d 717, 730 n.8 (Tex. 1995) (“[T]he Legislature may [not] define what
constitutes a general diffusion of knowledge so low as to avoid its obligation to make suitable
provision imposed by article VII, section 1” of the Texas Constitution.).
234. Content Standards, Cal. Dep’t Educ., http://www.cde.ca.gov/be/st/ss/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
235. See supra Part I.
236. Koski & Reich, supra note 204, at 564–65; Bauries, supra note 126, at 724 (citing James E.
Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1223, 1233–38 (2008)).
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4. Citizenship Approach
In Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, then-Professor
237
Liu argued that the guarantee of national citizenship found in the
Fourteenth Amendment obligates the national government to ensure
238
educational adequacy. Here in California, the education clauses in
article IX are robust enough to obviate the need to couch the right to
education inside other constitutional rights, but the effect of these
arguments is the same: in order to be a citizen, one must have sufficient
education to be able to participate in the political and economic life of
the state. Liu argues that “[c]itizenship requires a threshold level of
knowledge and competence for public duties such as voting, serving on a
jury, and participating in community affairs, and for the meaningful
239
exercise of civil liberties like the freedom of speech.”
This is the right approach to take here. From the framers’ debates,
one can see that California’s founders were concerned primarily with the
citizenship aspects of a good education, including guaranteeing a stable
economy, an upwardly mobile populace, and the ability to self-govern, and
emphasized the necessity of being able to participate in the political life
240
of the state, John Swett, arguably the father of public education in
California, urged that physical facilities, desks, and textbooks, as well as
strong teacher qualifications and pedagogical methods, were essential to
providing an adequate education (along with state inspection and
241
supervision).
The California Constitution itself lists a number of rights that are
integral to the requirements of citizenship in the state, all of which are
instructive when defining an adequate education. Article I, section 3
guarantees the right of the people to petition government for redress of
grievances, and to access information concerning the conduct of the
242
243
people’s business. Article I, section 9 protects the right to contract,
244
and article II, section 2 guarantees the right to vote. Finally, article I,
245
section 19 guarantees the right to trial by jury. Each of these rights is
dependent on an educated populace, with sufficient literacy, verbal,
math, and civics education to enable it to participate in the economic and

237. Now an associate justice of the California Supreme Court.
238. Liu, supra note 13, at 330.
239. Id. at 345. This is the approach of at least one court to address the adequacy issue. In New
York, adequacy requires learning the “basic literacy, calculating, and verbal skills necessary to enable
children to eventually function productively as civic participants capable of voting and serving on a
jury.” Campaign for Fiscal Equality v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995).
240. 1879 Debates, supra note 35, at 1087.
241. Carr, supra note 22, at 102; Hendrick, supra note 23, at 15.
242. Cal. Const. art. I, § 3.
243. Id. art. I, § 9.
244. Cal. Const. art. II, § 2.
245. Cal. Const. art. I, § 19.
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political life of the state. For example, one must be able to read to vote,
to write to petition one’s government, and to do math in order to
participate fully in the economic life of the state (including contracting).
This approach, too, inevitably invites criticism. First, these baseline
“citizenship” requirements are far less robust than the state standards.
Reformers who would argue for a constitutional right to full-service
schools (such as those that guarantee healthcare, or nutrition) would not
find the underpinning of that right in this theory. Second, these goals are,
in some senses, a moving target. The literacy skills necessary to vote and
serve on juries might have been different at the founding than they are
now. Similarly, the numeracy skills critical for participating in economic
life today might in the future be eclipsed by the ability to write code.
Tying the definition to societal norms might produce a more just
result, however, for as society changes, the minimum requirements of
education must change with it. The court could evaluate claims based on
the citizenship approach to adequate education using a combination of
inputs (facilities, teaching tools, textbooks, and funding) and outputs
(ability of students to pass state tests in certain subjects). Both methods
246
find support in California Supreme Court case law.
V. The Court Must Define and Clarify the Right to Education in
Order to Prevent Confusion Among Lower Courts.
The Supreme Court of California must eventually define the meaning
of article IX. Even now, there are ongoing lawsuits about teacher tenure,
247
248
layoffs, dismissal, inadequate instructional time, and statewide denial
249
of English learner instructional services, all of which will touch on, if not
rely on, the court’s interpretation of what article IX requires. Recent
250
settlements regarding teacher layoffs, the use of unproven teaching
251
252
methods, and school fees, as well as the ongoing procedure in place
253
after the settlement in Williams v. State regarding school resources,
show that courts at all levels remain actively involved in defining the
right to education.

246. See Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 939 (Cal. 1976) (ascribing differences in pupil
achievement to “differences in dollars,” but also condoning the use of “pupil output as a measure of
the quality of a district’s educational program”).
247. Vergara v. State, No. BC484642 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 1, 2014).
248. Complaint at 1–8, Cruz v. State, No. 14727139 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 29, 2014).
249. D.J. v. State, No. BS142775, 2014 WL 4064226 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 24, 2014).
250. Complaint, Reed v. State, No. BC432420, 2011 WL 10893745 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 18–21,
2011) (settled in 2014).
251. Complaint, Doe 1 v. State, No. 34-80001164 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 30, 2012) (settled in 2012).
252. Complaint at 1, Doe v. State, No. BC445151 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 2010) (dismissed in 2012
due to new legislation).
253. Order Granting Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Second Cause of Action at 3–5,
Williams v. State, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 10, 2003).
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Lower courts need guidance from the supreme court to decide these
critical questions. In recent education cases, courts have shown confusion
about California’s education jurisprudence and a misunderstanding
about the constitutional mandate. For example, in a superior court order
in Reed, the court alternated its discussion of “basic equality of
educational opportunity,” an equal-protection-focused phrase coined in
Butt, with a description of “basic educational opportunity,” implying an
254
adequacy mandate. Other courts have split on their interpretation of
255
Butt’s command for “basic educational equality.”
For example, in Williams, plaintiffs alleged that California failed to
provide adequate, safe, and healthy facilities; enough qualified teachers,
libraries, and instructional materials; and schools that were not
256
overcrowded. There, the superior court in San Francisco dismissed
plaintiffs’ causes of action under article IX, sections 1 and 5, holding that
these sections are not self-executing in all circumstances because
257
education is assigned to the state legislature. Even while reaffirming a
right to “basic educational equality” from Butt, the court held that
sections 1 and 5 were directed to the legislature, not the courts, and that
section 1 “merely indicates principles, without laying down rules by
258
means of which those principles may be given the force of law.” The
court, notably, avoided deciding whether section 5 creates a “substantive,
259
actionable right to education.”
An entirely different interpretation came out of the superior court
in Los Angeles, in the recent case of Vergara v. State. There, plaintiffs
alleged that the state’s teacher tenure laws resulted in “grossly
260
ineffective” teachers. In finding for the plaintiffs, the court held that
“this Court is directly faced with issues that compel it to apply these
constitutional principles [of equality] to the quality of the educational
261
It characterized the right to education under the
experience.”
California Constitution as a mix of equality and adequacy, characterizing

254. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order Granting Final Approval of Settlement,
Reed v. State, No. BC432420, 2011 WL 10893745, at *2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 18–21, 2011) (affirming
right to “basic equality of educational opportunity”); id. at *19 (stating that additional turnover at the
targeted schools “would cause material harm to faculty stability and the ability to deliver basic
educational opportunity to the students.”) (emphasis added). This was a lawsuit brought on behalf of
Los Angeles school children whose schools were laying off disproportionate numbers of new teachers,
disproportionately affecting low-income, minority students. Id. at *1–2.
255. Butt v. State, 842 P.2d 1240, 1251 (Cal. 1992).
256. Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint at 21–22, Williams v. State, No. 312236 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Aug. 14, 2000).
257. See Order Granting Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings as to Second Cause of Action,
supra note 253, at 3–5.
258. Id. at 3.
259. Id. at 4.
260. Tentative Decision at 3, Vergara v. State, No. BC484642 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 1, 2014).
261. Id. (emphasis in original).
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the right as a right to “a basically equal opportunity to achieve a quality
262
education.” This court, unlike the Williams court, found no separation
of powers barriers to “apply[ing] constitutional principles of law to the
Challenged Statutes as it has done here, and trust[ing] the legislature to
fulfill its mandated duty to enact legislation on the issue herein discussed
263
that passes constitutional muster.”
The California Court of Appeal has also weighed in on the issue in
the context of home schooling. In Jonathan L. v. Superior Court, the
court undertook a review of other states’ methods of guaranteeing that
264
their home schooled children were receiving an adequate education.
The court went on to detail other states’ mechanisms for ensuring an
adequate home school education, including requirements to ensure
capable teaching, student progress by way of evaluations, individualized
education plans for each student and reports on those plans, annual
assessment, and the option to terminate home schooling if objectives are
265
consistently unmet. The court ended its opinion with a plea: “Given the
state’s compelling interest in educating all of its children (Cal. Const., art.
IX, § 1), and the absence of an express statutory and regulatory
framework for home schooling in California, additional clarity in this
266
area of the law would be helpful.”
The supreme court must heed this call. As outlined above, the
Williams court’s reading of the state’s constitution comports neither with
the framers’ intent nor with the history of constitutional litigation in
education in this state. Yet, without clear direction about the meaning of
the education clauses, courts will continue to produce inconsistent
jurisprudence.
Conclusion
Since the California Supreme Court’s decision in Serrano I, there is
no doubt that the state constitution guarantees the right to an education,
and an education that encompasses more than simply “access to a
schoolhouse.” Although equal protection litigation has done much to
level the playing field, thousands of students are still deprived of a bare
minimum of educational qualityan unconstitutional result given the
text and history of the constitution, the education case law in California,
and the similar conclusions of supreme courts nationwide. The Supreme
Court of California must weigh in on this issue, to reduce confusion in
the lower courts and produce a more just educational system for
California’s children. The citizenship approach, in which the supreme
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 16.
See Jonathan L. v. Superior Ct., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 595–96 (2008).
Id. at 596.
Id.
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court evaluates whether schools provide enough education to teach
students to be citizens, finds support in the history and language of the
California Constitution, in corresponding constitutional provisions
guaranteeing civic participation, in the education case law, and in the
logical underpinnings of article IX. An inadequate education is not an
education. This is the approach that the court should take.
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